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Abstract 
This paper asks whether and how modern law may be understood as necessarily public in 
character. It begins by looking at the two main ways—doctrinal and disciplinary—in which 
law is understood as only selectively and contingently public. In both these cases law's public 
quality is counterposed to its private quality. However, publicness can also be conceived of 
as the juridical master category embracing the public and the private in the disciplinary and 
doctrinal senses. This conception of the necessary and irreducible publicness of law draws on 
the tradition of ius publicum, recently revived in the Anglophone world in the work of Martin 
Loughlin. That body of thought conceives of the state as a pre-positive and generically public 
jural foundation—a scheme of intelligibility for making sense of the positive law 
(constitution, statute law, common law) of the state. This is a plausible and powerful way of 
understanding the history of the modern state-based, sovereigntist legal constellation. 
However, it may be challenged both methodologically for elevating the state-based account 
to the status of the only plausible narrative, and substantively for its inability to capture the 
state-decentring aspects of contemporary globalization. A conception of pre-positive 
publicness no longer simply proposed as a dominant, value-neutral historical paradigm of 
explanation, but now underpinned by a normative commitment to democracy, is proposed as 
way of addressing both the methodological and the substantive limitations of the ius 
publicum account. 
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On The Necessarily Public Character of Law 
 
Neil Walker 
 
1. Introduction 
No-one would deny that the adjective ‘public’ has much to contribute to our understanding of 
the nature of modern law. Just how much is less clear. There are certainly various senses in 
which we can consider some law, or some laws, as possessing a public character, but is there 
any significant sense in which we can consider all modern law as having a public character? 
And what connection, if any, is there between these two measures of law’s public character? 
Does the difficult case for the public character of all law—in other words, for law’s 
necessarily public character—gain support from any of the indisputable ways in which some 
law displays a public character—in other words, from law’s selectively and contingently 
public character?  
My answer to both questions is a qualified yes. In the first place, there is a significant 
sense in which we may consider all law as having a public character. It is a fragile and 
disputed sense, and one that is under more threat than ever in today’s world. Yet, however 
elusive the idea of the necessarily public quality of law, it remains a central theme of our 
attempts to make sense of law today as well as an important point of departure in our efforts 
to imagine the legal future. In the second place, that necessarily public character of all law is 
related to at least some of the ways in which law can be understood to be selectively and 
partially public, although the connections are indirect and have to be carefully traced. 
 In unpacking this argument below, we proceed from the more modest to the more 
ambitious claims. We begin by looking at the different ways in which the public label can be 
applied selectively to law. Then, in the light of what that tells about the relationship between 
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law and ‘publicness’, we move to examine the proposition that law in some significant sense 
has a necessarily public character.  
 
2. False Beginnings 
  
Before embarking on this line of inquiry, however, we should pause to note, and to set to one 
side, one relatively insignificant sense in which law can be said to possess a necessarily 
public character. If, as Wittgenstein famously argued, we cannot imagine such a thing as a 
private language,1 then, by close analogy, we might also hold such a thing as a ‘private law’ 
to be unimaginable, and by this route assert law’s ‘public’ quality to be necessary and 
inevitable. What Wittgenstein was alluding to was the idea that language is an undeniably 
social accomplishment, and that it is so in a double sense. It is both the case that language’s 
basic purpose is the social one of communication and that the achievement of that basic 
purpose depends upon the successful social activity of arriving at a common or at least 
overlapping sense of what is meant, or signified, by the symbols making up a language. So, 
too, law may be conceived of as a social accomplishment in a double sense—both in its aim 
and in its method. Its basic purpose is the effective articulation and communication of a 
common normative framework,2 and the achievement of that purpose depends upon the 
development of some shared or overlapping sense of the meaning of norms, or at least some 
shared or overlapping sense as to how we should arrive at an authoritative version of the 
meaning of these norms.  
Such a quick conclusion, however, begs more questions than it answers for anyone 
investigating whether law necessarily possesses a ‘public’ character. In the first place, it 
assumes that the opposite of ‘private’ is always ‘public’. Or, more strictly, that the non-
                                                
1 L Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953) para 256 et seq. 
2 Se M van Hoecke Law as Communication (Oxford: Hart, 2002) 
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private is by definition public, thereby exhausting all categorical possibilities. But that 
assumption risks stretching the meaning of ‘public’ further than we want, and in so doing 
rendering the claim that law is necessarily ‘public’ overinclusive and even trivial. After all, 
we have argued nothing more here than that law is intrinsically social; and if anything that is 
‘social’ is by definition ‘public’, then the claim that law has a necessarily public character 
adds nothing to our understanding of law. 
 In the second place, if the issue is approached from the opposite direction, then the 
claim that law can never be ‘private’ goes against deep conventional usage. There may be 
much theoretical controversy about the proper conception of private law, but there is very 
little dispute about the significance of the core concept or idea of private law.3 The term 
‘private law’, as generally understood, specifies a disciplinary field of law that deals with 
those relationships between individuals with which the state or a similar ‘public body’ has no 
direct concern. Simply to ignore this ‘private’ aspect to law, which would be the consequence 
of reducing and restricting the private to the realm of the mentally interior and non-social in 
the Wittgensteinian sense, would be to deny much about how we understand the disciplinary 
division of the legal world. What is more, that same disciplinary division yields, on the other 
side, the domain of ‘public law’, which suggests a very different, and as we shall see, much 
more significant conception of legal ‘publicness’ than one that rests merely on law’s social 
quality  
 
3. The Selective ‘Publicness’ of Law 
 
There are two key ways in which we conceive of the ‘public’ character of law in a selective 
fashion. First, we consider law to be selectively ‘public’ with reference to various aspects of 
                                                
3 See e.g. P. Cane, “The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay” (2005) 25 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Theory 203-217. 
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legal doctrine. This involves the characterization of some legally relevant feature of the 
world— a form of property, an office, an action, a service, a policy, a location, a relationship, 
an interest, a benefit, a duty—as somehow ‘public’ The point of the attribution of 
‘publicness’ here is particularizing and practical. It is particularizing in that its focus is on a 
specific norm or complex of norms. It is practical—that is, it involves the application of 
practical reason4 —inasmuch as it is concerned with working out what that norm means and 
how one should act on the basis of that norm. 
Secondly, as already noted in the Introduction, we think of law as being selectively 
‘public’ with regard to the disciplinary division between private law and public law. What we 
are concerned with in this case is a distinction that can be made within any and all legal 
systems between two basic branches or fields of law—a distinction that turns upon whether 
the state or similar ‘public body’ is or is not directly involved in the matters regulated. The 
point of the ‘public’ attribution here, therefore, is not particularizing and practical, but 
generalizing and theoretical. It is generalizing in that its aim is to allocate a legal norm or set 
of legal norms to one rather than another broad disciplinary category—public rather than 
private. It involves the application of theoretical reason inasmuch as it is concerned with the 
regulation of belief about the law rather than of action within the law; in particular, with 
developing a better understanding of the nature of the legal universe, its internal structure, 
and how it fits with the social and political world in which it figures.  
Of course, these two senses of publicness—doctrinal and disciplinary—are closely 
interconnected, but they remain distinctive in ways that tend to be underappreciated. First, 
while much of the discipline of ‘public law’ covers how we invoke notions of the ‘public’ in 
legal doctrine, the fit is far from perfect. For it is also the case that, as we illustrate below, 
many doctrinal invocations of ‘publicness’ take place within the disciplinary field of private 
                                                
4 The distinction between theoretical and practical reason has its origins in Classical Greek philosophy, most 
prominently in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. For an overview, see R. J. Wallace, “Practical Reason” 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2008); available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/ 
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law (contract, tort, trusts, etc); likewise, many state or other public bodies that we locate 
within the disciplinary field of public law engage in particular legal activities and relations 
that we primarily associate with private parties (procurement, employment etc). Secondly, 
and more importantly for present purposes, as is suggested by the distinction between 
practical and theoretical reason, while the use of the ‘public’ in a doctrinal sense is internal to 
the domain of positive law, the deployment of public law in a disciplinary sense is external to 
the domain of positive law. It is concerned with how, as students, practitioners, authors or 
subjects of the law, we grasp and make sense of the legal world.—with how we comprehend 
the anatomy of the legal order, and in particular, with the contribution of that part of the legal 
anatomy known as ‘public law’. In a nutshell, where publicness as doctrine is concerned with 
authority within the many particulars of the law, publicness in the disciplinary sense is 
concerned with the surface forms and, at root, the deep structure of authority of the law in 
general. And, as we shall see in due course, this distinction between the internal and the 
external, as well as that between the particular and the general, leads us to draw different 
conclusions about the contribution of the two selective perspectives on law’s publicness—the 
doctrinal and the disciplinary—to the argument about law’s necessarily public quality. 
  
A. ‘Publicness’ in Legal Doctrine  
 
If we now turn to consider in rather more detail, first, the doctrinal dimension of publicness, 
what is immediately striking is the sheer variety of ways in which ideas of publicness 
impinge upon the law. This is not simply a function of the vast range and diversity of 
situations in which the characterization of some legally relevant feature of the world as public 
makes a difference to how implicated agents may or should act. Rather, it reflects a more 
fundamental truth. As Raymond Geuss has powerfully argued, “there is no such thing as the 
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public/private distinction, or, at any rate, it is a deep mistake to think that there is a single 
substantive distinction here that can be made to do any real philosophical or political work.”5 
Instead, it is a division that has grown over pre-modern and modern times, bringing together 
“[d]isparate components—conceptual fragments, theories, folk reactions, crude distinctions 
that are useful in highly specific practical contexts, tacit value assumptions— from different 
sources and belonging to different spheres”.6 
So various yet historically interwoven are the strands from which our modern 
contemporary distinction between the public and private is constructed, indeed, that they defy 
easy classification, as do the ways in which these strands map on to legal doctrine. 
Nevertheless, we can distinguish a number of different if overlapping broad frontiers of 
meaning. The most venerable basis for the distinction, originating in classical times, concerns 
modes of access to or control over property or (of increasing relevance in the modern state) 
information.7 Property or information which falls on the public side of the divide—across a 
boundary that itself can be blurred and uncertain—carries with it both legal privileges and 
legal restrictions. On the one hand, the publicness of property or information implies 
common access and availability. On the other hand, there are constraints of decency, of 
orderly behaviour, of modes of assembly, of non-discriminatory exclusion and inclusion, of 
state security etc, as regards the enjoyment of public property and public access to 
information which do not apply to property or information in private ownership or 
possession.  
Secondly, there is a more capacious idea of publicness which specifies the realm of 
matters and affairs that concern everyone as opposed to purely personal or group concerns 
and interests.8 Again, this is of classical vintage, and again it is greatly expanded in the 
                                                
5 R. Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 106. 
6 Ibid 10. 
7 Ibid 7. 
8 Ibid ch.3. 
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modern age. The legal doctrinal manifestations of the recognition of this special public 
sphere—of res publica in its expansive meaning9 —are many and varied. Again, the 
implications of the attribution of publicness may be either burdensome or advantageous. It 
may impose higher standards, deeper obligations and wider responsibilities. Alternatively, it 
may involve the granting of immunities or the bestowal of other benefits. What is covered 
here includes the expansive public- regarding duties of care of public authorities in tort and 
their distinctive susceptibility to judicial review on grounds of procedural fairness and 
substantive rationality, as well as the latitude granted to public authorities just because of the 
range and diversity of their obligations and their scarcity of resources;10 or the special 
legislative (and sometimes common law) powers attaching to certain officials as opposed to 
private citizens to carry out key tasks of state—for example the police and security services—
as well as special offences, supervisory regimes and sanctions associated with the abuse of 
these special powers;11 or the greater immediacy of legal responsibility associated with the 
perpetration of certain acts by public rather than private bodies, including the ‘horizontal 
direct effect’ of EU legislative directives on public bodies, and the imposition of a direct 
obligation on public bodies to act consistently with human rights under current British 
legislation.12 In all of these cases, moreover, again the definitional question of the boundaries 
of publicness, and so whether a particular entity or act belongs to the public sphere, can prove 
controversial. Different, inconsistent and sometimes mutually contested lines of doctrine 
exist. They variously emphasize one or more of legal source and pedigree, institutional form 
and location, autonomous or unilateral authority, functional or purposive remit, range of 
                                                
9 The fact that res publica as originally and narrowly conceived referred only to public ‘property’, as in our first 
formulation of the public/private divide, is, of course, itself a good illustration of the historical fluidity and 
interconnectedness of ideas of ‘publicness’. See Geuss, n5 above, ch.3. 
10 See, for example, D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Butterworths: London, 1999) 
esp. chs 5 and 8.  
11 For a recent discussion of the police case, see the exchange between Malcolm Thorburn and John Gardner; M. 
Thorburn, “Justification, Powers and Authority” (2008) 117 Yale Law Journal 1070; “Reinventing The Night-
Watchman State? (2010) 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 425-443; J. Gardner, “Justification Under 
Authority” (2010) 23 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 71 
12 Human Rights Act 1998, s6. 
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interests served, or target constituencies, as more or less influential upon or decisive of the 
question of publicness of the entity or act in question.13  
Thirdly, there is a sense of publicness in legal doctrine the function of which, in the 
tradition of modern liberalism, is to define the limits of the private domain conceived of as a 
protected area of activity and choice.14 This might appear simply to be the flipside of the 
previous distinction, but the underlying rationale and point of departure—the negative aim of 
establishing the outer boundaries of a universal private domain rather than the positive aim of 
establishing the contours of the public domain—is somewhat different.15 Here, to take but a 
few examples, we may be talking about the contra bonos mores qualification of the right to 
enforce private contractual terms or conditions of a will, or the public interest defence to 
defamation, or restrictions on the right to privacy on grounds of public safety, or restrictions 
on the freedom of conscience or religion in order to protect public order, health or morals.16 
Within legal doctrine, then, we see many different, if complexly overlapping 
rationales for classifying certain things as public, which rationales inform an immense range 
of different legal propositions What is more, legal doctrine is no mere passive receptor of 
these rationales. Rather, it exhibits a degree of reflexivity in debating and developing the 
meaning and location of the various threshold distinctions—public property, public space, 
public order, public safety, public interest etc—upon which the applicability if the relevant 
legal propositions depend. That reflexivity only serves to reinforce the sense that, from a 
doctrinal perspective, the boundaries of the public and the location(s) of the public/private 
                                                
13 These debates are probably most fully developed and engaged over the question of the scope of judicial 
review. Here, as elsewhere, the doctrinal position is often complicated by the fact that judges seek a balance 
between universalism and particularism—between a sense that the general rationale of the public-private divide 
should be similar across jurisdictions, and so foreign precedents should be considered as persuasive authority, 
and a sensitivity to distinctively locally rooted conditions and considerations. See, for example, in the context of 
the treatment of the supervisory jurisdiction under Scots and English law, A. McHarg, “Border Disputes: The 
Scope and Purposes of Judicial Review” In A McHarg and T. Mullen (eds) Public Law in Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Avizandum, 2006) 219-240.  
14 Geuss, n5 above, ch.5.  
15 Ibid. 76-80. 
16 The last two examples are drawn from Articles 8 and 9 respectively of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,  
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distinctions are drawn within the law—supplying a range of internal cuts and divisions—
rather than being coterminous with the boundaries of the law itself. There is no question, 
then, that when we consider publicness as a doctrinal category, it invariably involves a partial 
and selective claim about the public nature of law rather than a comprehensive and necessary 
one. 
 
B. ‘Public Law’ as a Disciplinary Field 
 
When we come to consider ‘public law’ in the disciplinary sense, these qualities of partiality 
and selectivity are even more palpable, and so may seem on first view yet more remote from 
any claim that publicness is definitive of law in general. Whereas private law, as we have 
already noted, designates the field of law that deals with those relationships between 
individuals with which the state or similar ‘public bodies’ have no direct concern, public law 
designates that field of law in which the state or similar ‘public’ bodies are in direct 
relationship with individuals and other legal persons, or in which different organs or agencies 
of the state or similar ‘public bodies’ are in relationship with one another. In other words, the 
very disciplinary definition of public law implies its merely partial coverage of the legal field. 
What is more, given that public law, when used in this disciplinary sense, essentially 
serves as an organising category offered as part of an external perspective upon the legal field 
in general, its basic analytical mode is a broadly descriptive one, and one that tends to take 
for granted the validity of the underlying framework within which that description takes 
place. The depiction of the public domain, in other words, is preoccupied with the surface 
‘what’ rather than the deep ‘why’ of law’s anatomy. As that depiction is not concerned with 
particular doctrine or its legal consequences, it need not closely attend to the various specific 
and in some measure inconsistent distinguishing criteria of publicness—pedigree, authority, 
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function, interests etc—to be found in legal doctrine, and with the harder questions these 
more precise tests raise about the rationale for the public/private divide. Rather, the focus of 
the disciplinary view is on the core rather the periphery, on the undisputed heartlands rather 
than the disputed boundaries of publicness. For these purposes, the deep-rooted institutional 
connection between publicness and the apparatus of the modern state provides a definitional 
short cut that reinforces the tendency to curtail the more difficult questions, and the more 
revealing answers. The regular addition of ‘similar public bodies’ to the definition, therefore, 
is not typically intended to highlight complexity and inviting examination of difficult 
margins. Instead, it is often no more than an impatiently tautologous addendum to an 
unquestioned basic definition. 
  
3. The Necessary ‘Publicness’ of Law 
A. ‘Public Law’ as law’s constitutive discipline 
 
Yet this is not the whole story. There is also a body of work that is more concerned with and 
detained by the deep ‘why’ rather than merely the surface ‘what’ of the disciplinary quality 
and integrity of public law. Much of this literature, and much of the thinking that animates 
this literature, is not in the English language or tradition, but in that of other European 
continental countries. This is due in no small part to the different developmental trajectories 
of different national legal systems. Aspects of the evolution of national law have had the 
effect of making the public quality of law, considered as a distinct field, a more salient 
consideration in continental Europe. These include the modern tradition of foundational 
constitutionalism and the institutionalization within civilian legal systems of separate sub-
systems of administrative law and administrative courts—‘administrative’ referring to the 
administration of governmental power and so being a category itself conventionally 
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dependent upon a distinction between the exercise of public and private power.17 However, 
more recently, notwithstanding the absence of these features from our domestic legal 
traditions, there have been notable attempts to deepen our understanding of the disciplinary 
idea of public law in the British context which draw upon this wider European stream of 
thinking.  
 The contribution of Martin Loughlin is of pivotal significance here.18 In a nutshell, 
the manner in which his work, and the European tradition he draws upon, seeks to make 
deeper sense of the discipline of public law is by showing how it can be understood as 
underpinning the legal system as a whole. Drawing upon older notions such as ius politicum, 
droit politique and Staatsrecht, Loughlin argues that beneath the topsoil of the field of public 
law considered as constituted, and so as positive law, there is a deeper layer of public law 
considered as constitutive, and so pre-positive and even pre-Constitutional. Public law, in this 
prior, deeper sense, is precisely “that which confers the right to govern by way of positive 
law.”19 Of crucial importance, then, in terms of forging the link between a selective and a 
necessary understanding of law’s public quality, while Loughlin’s field of public law is still 
only one part of the legal universe, it now becomes the framing and therefore indispensable 
part.  
But what does this deeper and constitutive layer consist of, and in what sense is it 
‘public’ and in what sense ‘law’? The deeper layer consists, most basically, of the set of 
regulative understandings that establish the sovereign character of the modern state. That is to 
say, it embraces the claim of the state, composed of the familiar troika of demarcated 
territory, ruling authority and people20, to institute the autonomy and absolute authority of the 
                                                
17 See e.g. Oliver n10 above, 16-19. 
18 See, in particular, his two key monographs The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003); Foundations of 
Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010). In what follows, I will instead concentrate on a few articles that offer cogent 
and concise statements of his ideas.  
19 M. Loughlin “In defence of Staatslehre” (2009) 48(1) Der staat, 1-28, 5. 
20 Ibid 5-6. 
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political sphere—which sphere we also call ‘public’ as it is synonymous with that of public 
affairs rather than private force or property. And even though they are pre-positive, these 
concepts of state and sovereignty, must, for Loughlin, remain juristic concepts—concepts of 
public law. This is so, first, because sovereign political or public authority cannot be 
understood as an abstraction but must be secured and expressed in institutional form, and this 
is achieved by vesting or presupposing an original “rightful power”21 in the state and its 
office of government. Secondly, not only the form but also the medium of sovereign state 
authority is legal, since the power that is conferred or presupposed is of an order that “equips 
government with an unlimited competence to govern through the instrumentality of [positive] 
law.”22  
Loughlin’s aim in seeking to retrieve this pre-positive notion of the field and 
discipline of public law—a subject that he claims “seems to have fallen off contemporary 
maps of knowledge”23—is to trace the deep structure of legal and political authority to the 
idea of the state itself and no further. By so doing, he wants to challenge various 
misconceptions of the place of law and politics in the modern order of things that have filled 
the gaps left by the evacuation of the field by his preferred Staatslehre. In particular, he wants 
to reject, on the one hand, the idea of the state as the “agent”24 of some other and higher 
authority, whether metaphysical or Constitutional, and on the other hand, an “essentialism” 25 
that treats the state as the embodiment of some prior existential unity of the people. Instead, 
he seeks to show that the state, considered as a juristic idea in its own right rather than as 
something either merely post-Constitutional and so positive law or as mysteriously pre-legal, 
                                                
21 Ibid 5.  
22 Ibid 5.  
23 M. Loughlin “Reflection on The Idea of Public Law” in E. Christodoulidis and S. Tierney (eds) Public Law 
and Politics: The Scope and Limits of Constitutionalism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 47-65, 47. 
24 Loughlin, n19 above, 7. 
25 Ibid 10 
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is the framing “scheme of intelligibility”26 through which peoplehood and positive law are 
mutually and reflexively constructed and reconstructed over time. There is, in other words, no 
law that stands above the state and the political realm, but equally and reciprocally, there can 
be no articulation and operationalisation of the state and of the political qua political other 
than through and in the form of law. Public law, then, in this deeper form, is neither the 
servant nor the master of politics. Rather, it is politics, conceived of in its generative rather 
than its programmatic mode.  
In looking to the juristic idea of the state and no further, Loughlin seeks to account 
both for what is distinctive about the modern political and public realm as compared to pre-
modern systems of authority and for what the modern retains from the pre-modern. On the 
one hand, the very defining modern character of the political as political, and so of the public 
sphere as a public sphere, depends precisely upon its autonomy from other world-views. It 
supplies a new “representation—from a distinctive perspective—of the entire society”,27 in so 
doing claiming to possess a self-constituting and so only self-limiting character that stands 
independent of any prior metaphysical or traditional forms of authority. Of course, res 
publica, as we have seen, has a pre-modern etymology, and at the doctrinal level this 
continues today in a whole range of operational indicators of what belongs to the domain of 
public affairs and what does not. However, only in the modern age does the idea of public 
authority also become the master or ‘second order’ category for deciding the nature of the 
‘first order’ split between public and private affairs. That is to say, the very decision as to 
what are public affairs and what are private affairs does itself become for the first time in the 
modern age a ‘public affair’, so to speak. On the other hand however, the framing of the 
autonomy of the political through the mechanism of a pre-positive public law inherits and 
                                                
26 Ibid 8 
27 Loughlin, n23 above, 57 
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adapts through a process of “secularization, historicization and positivization”28 some of the 
core assumptions of earlier conceptions of natural law; in particular, it retains and sustains the 
idea of a level of law that is framing rather than framed—positing rather than posited— 
supplying an irreducible and indefeasible basis for life in society.  
There are many aspects of Loughlin’s thesis that enrich our understanding of the 
public quality of modern law. Certainly, his central argument that there is a deep public law 
basis for the whole of positive law, including that part of the whole of positive law that also 
attracts the label ‘public’ in both the doctrinal sense and in the shallow disciplinary sense, 
contains a key insight. It suggests that we can and should understand law’s publicness at two 
levels, at both a deep and necessary ‘meta’ level and also as a selective ‘object’ of positive 
law. Yet while this captures something important about the public nature of law, certainly as 
historically understood, we have to push still further, both challenging and building on 
Loughlin’s views, in order to gain the fullest sense of what this has amounted to and what it 
might amount to in the future. 
 This impulse to question and to push matters further is provoked by the 
methodological premises underpinning Loughlin’s work, and so by the strengths but also the 
limits of the kind of exercise he believes himself to be engaged in. His exploration and 
explication of the foundations of public law, for all that this is a significant and increasingly 
densely documented and intricately woven body of historical scholarship,29 is not intended as 
a closely observed comparative empirical exercise—one looking at “the detailed 
arrangements of particular regimes”.30 Nor, however, is it offered as a study in purely ideal 
theory—intended to elaborate “the structure of some ideal constitution”31 and so instruct us 
as to how the modern relationship between politics and law should be conceived. Rather, it is 
                                                
28 Loughlin, n19 above, 5 
29 Especially with the recent publication of the 500 page Foundations of Public Law (n18 above). 
30 Loughlin, n23 above, 50. 
31 Ibid 49. 
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a kind of stylized reconstruction, a simultaneously deep and encompassing account of a 
dominant conception of state-building that allows us better “to understand the ways in which 
existing constitutional arrangements can be said to work.”32 Yet, for all the attractions of such 
an approach as a way of conveying a broad explanatory message, and for all Loughlin’s 
success in exploiting his methodology to provide an insightful account that retrieves a deeper 
sense of public law, the fact that the emphasis is neither on detailed empirical patterns nor on 
matters of ideal theory does leave certain questions hanging. And it is these questions, as we 
shall see, that prompt us to look beyond his own methodological prism to reframe and 
augment the question of the necessarily public quality of law.  
Let us begin, then, with the question of the empirical range and credentials of the kind 
of reconstructive thesis that Loughlin proposes. Historically, just how broadly encompassing 
has the tradition of pre-positive public law been? If it is supposed to be a defining feature of 
modernity and modern law tout court, how, for example, do we account for the British case, 
where the constitutive idea of public law seems most emphatically to “have fallen off the 
contemporary map of knowledge” and where, indeed, it is harder to discern its consistent 
outline in historical maps? For Loughlin, the most notorious indicator of British singularity, 
namely the fact that the United Kingdom lacks a written constitutional pedigree, need be no 
impediment to its inclusion within the wider tradition of ius publicum, since such written 
constitutional law is itself merely the highest form of positive public law. As he 
acknowledges,33 a documentary Constitution might, nonetheless, be viewed as a key product, 
and so as an important marker of the “scheme of intelligibility” and regulatory world-view 
that the deeper, pre-positive sense of public law encapsulates. Yet if we recall Loughlin’s 
understanding of the relationship between the constitutive law of ‘state formation’ and the 
constituted law of the ‘formed state’ as being reflexive and iterative, the ‘big bang’ 
                                                
32 Ibid 49 
33 Loughlin, n19 above, 14 
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documentary constitutional moment is neither the unique such marker nor even an 
indispensable component of the positive manifestation of an underlying constitutive public 
law. Rather, Loughlin stresses how the unwritten British constitution, centred on the idea of 
parliamentary sovereignty, can, like that of Britain’s continental neighbours, be understood to 
have gradually evolved out of a new state-centred way of thinking about public authority that 
is the functional equivalent of ius politicum.34  
Two difficulties, however, remain not only for the British case but for the historical 
record more generally. In the first place, however plausible the idea of a constitutive public 
law as the leitmotif of a comprehensive narrative about the generation and validation of 
positive law in the new age of the modern state, it is by no means the only narrative available. 
Typically, the positive law recognized by the modern state according to the deeper public 
authority of the ius publicum includes elements other than those documentary constitutional 
norms and legislative instruments that can be regarded as directly ‘constituted’ through the 
state. Other norms, including the common law and public international law, are instead 
recognized by the state system of positive law through homologation, incorporation or 
delegation. But there are other candidate narratives of generation for these extraneous 
elements. As Patrick Glenn persuasively argues, the common law itself is central to one such 
alternative narrative.35 Here understood broadly to refer to a diverse stream of law, including 
elements of ius gentium and customary law as well as the various nominal forms of ‘common 
law’ that have developed alongside or across different state laws, the common law’s key and 
defining feature in this generic mode is a claim to be common “in relation to”36 law that is 
particular to a specific and bounded domain—primarily, the particular constitutional law and 
statute law of the state. The idea of ‘in relation to’ covers many possibilities, These range 
form the nurturing or supplementation of the particular law by the common law within the 
                                                
34 See in particular, Foundations of Public Law, n18 above, ch. 9. 
35 H. P. Glenn On Common Laws (Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
36 Ibid ch.1. 
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domain of the particular law, to efforts through the common law to qualify or challenge the 
domain or content of the particular law, and also to attempts through common law to 
generalize and extend beyond the domain of the particular law. In all cases, the common law 
sensu largo is the repository and the expression of a set of claims to constitutive legal 
authority, typically grounded in conceptions of morality, in ethical constituencies or in 
communities of practice which transcend the state, that, while not (necessarily) denying a 
parallel claim to constitutive legal authority on the part of the state, challenge the claim of the 
ius publicum to provide through the pre-positive legal form of the state the exclusive source 
of positive legal authority within its jurisdiction.  
Of course, there is no compelling reason why the common law narrative of 
authority—of legal world-making—should be preferred over that of the ius publicum. But 
that is beside the point. Rather, the very fact that an alternative juristic narrative of authority 
exists to that of a state-based public authority has to be taken seriously. Because it is an 
account that is nurtured and sustained within some relevant epistemic communities (e.g. 
amongst judges, other constitutional officials and jurists), because it tells a plausible story 
about the sources of authority of at least some of those laws that are generally recognized as 
positive law within the community, and because its narrative may be more prominent in 
jurisdictions such as those of the United Kingdom where the ‘common law’ carries a 
longstanding nominal significance as an additional category of positive law and where some 
of the more obvious juristic props of state-centred public authority are absent, (such as a 
written constitutional tradition and a special terminology to distinguish pre-positive ‘Law’ 
[ius, le droit, das Recht] from positive ‘law’ [lex, le loi, das Gesetz]), the claims that 
Loughlin makes on behalf of ius publicum have to be reassessed. The public authority-
centred pre-positive account and authorization of the world of positive law that he reports 
remains a persuasive one, but it is not the only such claim ‘out there’, and it has to be 
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recognized that other deep accounts and authorizations of the world of positive law exist, and 
as a matter of historical fact provide alternative and in some respects rival schemes of 
intelligibility through which to construe that legal world.  
A second, and more urgent empirical difficulty surrounding the narrative of ius 
publicum concerns the contemporary effects of globalization. There is no doubt today that the 
global pattern of positive legal authority is an increasingly interconnected one. The growth of 
transnational collective action problems and state ‘externalities’ in a word in which persons, 
goods, capital, services, communications, cultural forms and political regimes increasingly 
circulate across state borders has meant that more and more legal initiatives involve parties 
other than single states and affect populations other than those of single states. This is evident 
in the rise of supranational law in Europe and other regions, in the development of global 
jurisgenerative institutions such as the UN and the WTO, in more citizen–centred rather than 
state-centred forms of international law in human rights and criminal law, in the development 
of new forms of transnational ‘administrative law’ (or ‘Global Administrative Law’) where 
forms of governance absent or attenuated from a formal Treaty base abound, and in the 
growth of forms of functionally specific self-regulation lacking the pedigree of any state or 
state-like ‘public’ authority in areas such as sport and the internet.37  
As Loughlin points out, none of this necessarily means, as many scholars of 
globalization too quickly assume, that, by world-historical standards, however measured, the 
nation state is in decline, or even that it exerts less overall influence than once it did.38 What 
it does mean, however, is that the manner in which states individually and collectively exert 
legal authority, and the kind of legal relations and ‘irrelations’ they inhabit with regard to 
other non-state polities and agencies, is altered. It follows that the deep juridical map of the 
post-Westphalian age in which, with ius publicum as its key, states provided the relatively 
                                                
37 See, e.g., my “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative 
Orders” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373-396.  
38 Loughlin, n19 above, 17 
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self-contained and mutually exclusive sovereign centres of authority, is less appropriate than 
once it was. It is no longer just a question, therefore, as in the historical example of the claims 
of the common law family of concepts, of there being a supplementary account of legal 
world-making that might challenge the ius publicum model at the margins. Rather, the basic 
model is itself under threat. The very way that we think of constitutive legal authority—how 
far state-centred, how far pooled across states, how far based in non-state settings, how far 
still a property of the state parts rather than the global whole—is now under challenge. 
Loughlin is by no means unaware of this challenge. He is also correct to point out that 
the series of answers to that challenge provided by many of those who perceive or advocate 
the progressive shift of constitutional authority to non-state sites is often inadequate. For 
Loughlin, these increasingly numerous and influential postnational constitutionalists often 
tend to mistake symptoms for causes, superstructure for base. They are apt to treat 
constitutions as purely normative entities and constitutionalization as a purely normative 
process; that is, as consisting only in the development of forms of non-state positive law that 
are in different ways—form, structure, content—analogous to the positive constitutional law 
of states. As Louglin says, unless the connection is retained or remade between the positive 
constitution and the underlying material constitution of public authority, this kind of 
approach cannot get beneath the surface of the problem it purports to address. Rather than 
answering the question of constitutive public authority reframed in the context of the new 
globalization, the emergent postnational constitutionalism often merely begs it. 39 
Yet the lack of a satisfactory alternative to Loughlin’s preferred Staatslehre does not 
rehabilitate the latter by default. It remains the case that present forms of legal and political 
globalization sharply question the sufficiency of a state-centred conception of public law as 
the constitutive basis of contemporary positive law. Here again, we come up against the 
                                                
39 Ibid 17 et seq. See also his “What is Constitutionalisation?” in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds) The Twilight 
of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 47-69. 
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limits of Loughlin’s approach. Just as the evidence finally runs out in any attempt to make the 
historical case for the dominant constituent role of ius publicum against all-comers, so too, 
and more obviously and urgently, the adequacy of the state-based public law account as a 
way of understanding the contemporary world of positive law is profoundly challenged under 
conditions of increased transnationalisation of legal authority. In the end, with his emphasis 
on the deep and general explanatory character of his thesis, Loughlin bequeaths to us a 
persuasive, but by no means irrefutable, account of the indispensably public historical basis 
of modern law, together with a version of the public foundations of law in today’s world that 
increasingly threatens to be undercut by the forces of globalization  
 If we want to continue and build upon the argument for the necessarily public quality 
of law as part of a two-level conception of publicness, we must recognize the restrictions 
imposed by a purely explanatory paradigm. As noted, Loughlin sets his stall out against ideal 
theory. He does so on the basis that its aspirational and ideological lens distorts 
understanding of how the world is,40 and also because, in concentrating on the ‘ought’, ideal 
theory can be inattentive to the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and so to the issue of whether 
and how that gap may be bridged.41 Yet, is there not a middle way? Can we not have an 
approach that that blends explanation, evaluation and ideal projection—that comprehends the 
real in light of the ideal and the ideal in light of the real? Can we not acknowledge the 
grounding of the idea of ‘publicness’ in certain historical and contemporary conditions of 
authority yet still try to find an ideal vantage point appropriate to these conditions for 
evaluating and criticizing or justifying these extant notions of publicness? Can we not in this 
way provide a more compelling account of why publicness has been important to law and 
why and how it might continue to be? And if we follow this approach, cannot the evaluative 
                                                
40 Loughlin, n23 above, 50-54. 
41 For example, in his critique of the excessive normativism and attendant neglect of the underlying material 
constitution in much postnational constitutional writing, he stresses how little attention is paid by the exponents 
of this approach to the necessary preconditions of the realization of their ideal conception of constitutionalism. 
See e.g. Loughlin, n 19 above, 17 et seq.  
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dimension be added to the balance sheet in assessing the merits of rival historical 
understandings of the law, as well as supplying guidance in our working out whether and how 
we might retain or restore the public foundations of contemporary law under conditions of 
globalization?  
 In the following subsection I will set about trying to answer these questions in the 
affirmative. We can only explore the deepest resonance and full potential of law’s publicness, 
I will argue, if we introduce this evaluative dimension. However, the consequence of so 
doing is not to resolve the question of law’s character under globalization but merely to open 
that question up to a wider range of possible answers. 
 
C. ‘Publicness ‘ of Law as Democratic Ideal and Aspiration 
 
In recent work Jeremy Waldron has begun to address the challenge of considering law’s 
publicness from a morally committed standpoint. He has sought to identify the necessarily 
public quality of modern law understood not only as a living practice, or as a legacy of past 
practice, but as a quality ideally suited to modern law.42 Where and how does he locate this 
ideal dimension?  
 For Waldron, the key benchmark of appropriateness—of ethical adequacy—of 
contemporary law, is supplied by the idea of democracy. We now live in an age in which, as 
Amartya Sen points out, the democratic ideal of collective self-rule has ceased to be 
understood in its various localities as a purely local need and has come instead to be endorsed 
as a “universal commitment”, and so as a ‘normal’ template of government.43 Democracy sets 
the basic standard of our political times, and our legal system, just like all our other 
modalities and institutions of government, should respect and reflect that basic standard. And 
                                                
42 See J. Waldron, “Can There be a Democratic Jurisprudence?” in New York University Public law and Legal 
Theory Working Papers (2008) 35. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280923. 
43 A. Sen “Democracy as a Universal Value” Journal of Democracy 10 (1999) 3 -17. 
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if, according to Waldron, we duly pursue the imperatives of a “democratic jurisprudence”44 
then we will conclude that modern law should indeed exhibit, amongst other things, a 
necessarily and irreducibly public quality, but one that is best expressed through the presence 
of key input and output dimensions of the democratic ethic of collective self-rule; that is to 
say, modern law should function through “(i)… norms that purport to stand in the name of 
the whole society, and (ii) …that address matters of concern to the society as such, not just 
matters of personal or sectional concern to the individuals who happened to be involved in 
formulating them.”45  
 We should note that, for Waldron, these standards mean both less and more than that 
each and every particular legal norm should emanate from a democratic source. While this 
may be an important way, indeed often the best way of fulfilling his first, input-based 
criterion, it is neither a strictly necessary nor a sufficient condition of the publicness of 
individual legal norms. It is not necessary because norms that are claimed to be made in the 
name of the whole society might be issued in good faith by those who have no formal 
democratic mandate but who can nevertheless plausibly claim to be “guardians of the public 
good”46 in particular contexts of action. It is insufficient because a democratic source is not 
enough for the law to be properly ‘public’ unless it also meets the output-based criterion and 
effectively presents itself as oriented to the needs of society as whole; that is to say, unless it 
“purports to promote the public good.”47  
Waldron’s approach is only sketchily developed. It is not explicitly concerned to 
pursue Loughlin’s central insight and distinguish between different tiers—constitutive and 
constituted—of public, democratic authority. Moreover, it does not directly engage with the 
                                                
44 Waldron, n42 above. 
45 Ibid 39. 
46 Ibid 39. 
47 Ibid 41. 
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question of non-state forms of public authority. Nevertheless, it supplies a highly suggestive 
platform for building a more normative element into the Loughlin conception of publicness.  
In the first place, the choice of democracy as a key background evaluative standard 
for publicness avoids the charge of remote or contentious idealism. More so than any other 
candidate ideal, the democratic standard is one that is both immanent within modern society 
and the modern state system, and, in principle, if not in practical detail, is relatively 
uncontroversial.  
In the second place, the particular link forged between the ideal background standard 
of democracy and the modern historical development of law’s constitutive public authority is 
a plausibly intimate one in which the real and the ideal are mutually informative. On the one 
hand, the real nurtured the ideal. Historically, the innovative modern idea of law as a 
constitutive public authority—so central to Loughlin’s analysis—was at least proto-
democratic in quality. It was based on a notion that certain matters should be treated as of 
general ‘public’ concern just in view of the fact that the interests of all members of society 
were affected. This, in turn, presupposed that the interests of all mattered and were to be 
taken into account, and the cultivation of such sentiments would lead eventually and after 
much social struggle to the development of modern institutional forms of representative 
democracy. Indeed, to recall the question of the historical credentials of law’s necessary 
publicness, that proto-democratic quality—the germ and prospect of the ideal in the real—is 
one of the reasons why, in accounting for what is distinctive about modern law, we might 
favour a narrative that locates the constitutive basis and self-authorizing narrative of modern 
law exclusively in the principles of ius publicum over a narrative hat embraces wider 
‘common law’ sources as constitutive. On the other hand, and completing the circle of mutual 
influence, the ideal may be deployed to reshape the real. The modern democratic imagination 
that emerged out of the social reality of the development of a constitutive conception of 
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public authority, and which, however tentatively and unevenly, has become consolidated 
within the mature forms of that constitutive framework, may be and has been reciprocally 
deployed as an ongoing critical standard against which to test and guide that sense of 
publicness in state-centred and state-decentred frameworks of contemporary law alike.  
In the third place, just as we understood the public character of law within a two-tier 
model as both the generative framework of all positive law and the selective object of that 
generative framework, so we may adapt and apply Waldron’s insights in order to comprehend 
the standard of democracy associated with publicness in similarly two-tier terms. Most 
basically, the background standard of democracy, itself rooted in the constitutive sense of 
public autonomy, speaks to the importance of collective self-rule as a meta-principle of 
political organisation. That is to say, the very framework conditions of the “political pact”48 
—the constitutive sense of the proper subjects, territorial and functional jurisdiction, and key 
offices of the political which, in Loughlin’s terms, make up the pre-positive juridical 
structure of the state—should so far as is possible, and even though they are by definition 
prior to the constituted forms of democratic rule, themselves be democratically mandated or 
homologated and be thus responsive to democracy’s input standard.49 Yet it does not follow 
from that constitutive democratic standard that every positive law duly constituted and every 
wide-ranging, public-affecting legal capacity duly created under positive law must or can 
itself meet the input standard of democracy. Sometimes there are reasons of principle why 
this is the case. Requirements of expertise, of impartial decision-making, of disinterested 
administration, of immunity from short-term electoral pressure, as well, of course, as the 
                                                
48 Loughlin, n19 above, 20.  
49 Loughlin himself fully appreciates the incipiently democratic quality of the second-order “political pact”. 
Indeed, he explicitly states that this pact rests on the principle of consent and, as such, also implies “some notion 
of representative, responsible, and accountable government” (Ibid 13). For him, however, this remains part and 
parcel of the ‘real’, and so a proper object of his explanatory thesis, rather than some ideal extrapolation from 
the real and benchmark for reinterpretation and refashioning of the real. 
 On the difficulties associated with the idea of a democratic theory prior to and about the terms of establishment 
of the demos, see, for example, my “Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative 
Relationship” University of Edinburgh Law School Working Paper Series 2010/25; available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650016  
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need—recognized in the very double articulation of modernity’s publicness at the 
comprehensive ‘meta’ level and selective ‘object’ level—to preserve significant spheres of 
private and associational autonomy within society, may militate against democratic forms of 
representation and accountability in and under the law. In these cases Waldron’s second, 
output-based criterion of publicness—that the norms generously and inclusively reflect and 
respond to concerns of society as a whole and not just particular sectional interests—may be 
in tension with and may override the case for democratic input standards. Furthermore, as we 
shall see, even where there is no such clash of principle, even when democratically inclusive 
‘output’ is not jeopardized by democratically narrow, short-term or divisive ‘input’, there 
may nevertheless be practical impediments to the development of forms of democratic input, 
in which case attention to democratic output standards can still be of significant 
compensatory value.  
Fourthly and finally, these considerations generate a decidedly mixed message for the 
prospects of a democratically informed standard of publicness under conditions of 
globalization. On the one hand, the Waldron approach is flexible in terms of what democratic 
jurisprudence demands of the public quality of law at the derivate, first-order level of 
individual legal norms. The fact that the democratic indices of publicness are about output 
standards as much as input standards allows considerable scope for forms of institutional 
design of positive law in which the link to a particular state-centred constituent people may 
be somewhat attenuated. On the other hand, if democratic pedigree is to count as the highest 
input standard, then it must be considered as especially important, perhaps even 
indispensable, at the basic, second-order level of the very constitution of publicness. That is 
to say, unless first-order legal norms and capacities of positive public law, whose own 
democratic credentials may only be output-based, can be ultimately traced back to an original 
second-order source of authority that exhibits incipiently democratic characteristics, then the 
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link upon which law’s constitutive sense of publicness depends is broken, and with that 
severance the very idea of law’s necessary publicness is jeopardized. 
It is this mixed message that underwrites the open-ended, contested character of the 
question of law’s necessary publicness under contemporary conditions. The prospects of a 
normatively informed idea of the necessary publicness of law in a globalizing age depend on 
just how these various first- and second-order issues of the relationship between democracy 
and public authority are approached and addressed. Crudely, we can distinguish three broad 
positions. First, there is a state-centred position in which the second-order publicness and the 
qualities of constitutive democracy associated with the second-order publicness of a state-
bases ius publicum remains the exclusive key to law’s necessarily public character. This is a 
position we can associate with Loughlin’s elaborately developed theoretical model, but also 
with a whole generation of state-centred thinkers within constitutional and international 
law.50 It holds that we can continue to conceive of the legal world in necessarily public terms 
only to the extent that non-state based positive law, whatever balance of input and output 
democratic qualities it might possess, can in the final analysis be understood as a delegation 
of authority from the original authority of the states. 
A second position is one that, by contrast, pays no or less attention to questions of 
second order publicness and instead concentrates on the public qualities of first-order legal 
norms across the dispersed network of global governance. The advocates of this position, of 
whom we find prominent examples under such banners as Global Administrative Law51 and 
                                                
50 Loughlin nevertheless emphasizes the difference between his own more fundamental critique of post-state 
constitutional theory, which is ultimately epistemic—tied to the uniqueness of the state-centred constitutional 
view of the world and of the conditions which make that world-view possible, and the critique offered by a 
typical state-centred constitutionalist such as Dieter Grimm who focuses only on the first-order normative or 
positive accomplishment of constitutionalism but nonetheless perceives the full form of such an 
accomplishment as culturally distinctive of and (probably) peculiar to the political form of the modern state. See 
Loughlin, n19 above. 18. See also D. Grimm “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization” (2005) 12 
Constellations 447.  
51 The Global Administrative Law project remains strongly associated with its founding institution, New York 
University. See, e.g., B. Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law” (2009) 20 European 
Journal of International Law 23-57; “International Law as Inter-Public Law” in H. S. Richardson and M.S. 
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global constitutional law,52 would want to exclude or downgrade the significance of second–
order publicness either because they do not consider that the kind of constitutive democratic 
publicness associated with the state-centred position can be plausible understood as the 
source of all legal authority in the dense and multiform structure of transnational regulation, 
or because they believe that such a pedigree based conception of democratic publicness 
should in any case be held wholly or largely irrelevant to the question of the legitimate 
authority of transnational law. In focusing on the credentials of diversely situated 
arrangements of first-order norms they tend to understand publicness in terms akin to what 
Michael Walzer would call a “reiterative universalism” 53 That is to say, on the one hand, the 
qualities of publicness are seen to be intrinsic to public law as generally understood, while, 
on the other, the articulation of these common norms is not seen as a matter of simply 
‘reading off’ the local version from some inert universal “covering law”,54 but as a 
continuous and progressive process of recontextualization in which the universal is reshaped 
by the particular. According to one prominent scholar of Global Administrative Law, for 
example, the relevant universals can form around notions as general as the principles of 
legality, rationality and proportionality, together with respect for the Rule of Law and basic 
protection of human rights.55 Over time, these normative ideas, all of which are engaged in 
democratic output-oriented tasks of “channelling, managing, shaping and constraining 
political power”56 tend to circulate more widely and more readily. Gradually, “as the layers of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Williams (eds) Moral Universalism and Pluralism (New York: NYU Press, 2009) 167-2004. Kingsbury draws 
explicitly on Waldron’s work (n42 above) in these pieces. See also the similar project on public authority and 
international institutions based at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg. See e.g. A Von Bogdandy, P. Dann 
and M. Goldmann, “Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a legal framework for 
Global Governance Activities” (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1375-1400. 
52 See e.g. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State” in J. L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds) Ruling the World? 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 258-325. 
53 M. Walzer, “Nations and Universe” in Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory (David Miller ed., 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007) 183-218, 187 
54 Ibid 184. 
55 See Kingsbury “The Concept of ‘Law’”n51 above, 31-34. 
56 Ibid 32 
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common normative practice thicken, they come to be argued for and adopted through a 
mixture of comparative study and a sense that they are (or are becoming) obligatory.”57 
Meanwhile, a similarly cosmopolitan story is being told today about the development of 
constitutional law across state and post-state sites, centred upon the nurturing at of universal 
constitutional commitments to principles of legality, subsidiarity, adequate participation and 
accountability, public reason and rights-protection.58 
 The reiterative universalists, therefore, believe in an authority system that is 
horizontal and normatively guided, whereas in the state-centred approach authority is 
understood to be vertical and lexically dictated. Democratic publicness, for the reiterative 
universalist, is about the trans-polity corroboration and vindication of best practice in polity 
sites that, in an increasing number of cases, lack a constitutive framework of democracy, 
whereas from the state-centred perspective it is first and foremost about continuing to insist 
on just that high modern constitutive pedigree even where it is becoming remote from the 
relevant transnational contexts of the regulation of collective action. One or other of the twin 
democratic imperatives of publicness, input or output—either a constitutive collective self-
authorization or an adopted commitment to an inclusive sense of public interest and 
responsibility in all legal contexts of collective action regardless of how removed they are 
from a constitutive frame — is given priority. Whichever side is emphasized however, the 
claim to publicness is arguably diminished and destabilized just because of the absence or 
neglect of the other.  
This opposition helps to account for the attraction of a third approach, one that tries to 
gives equal due to the importance of constitutive public authority and the shift of regulatory 
power away from the state. Such an outlook, often broadly based upon a Habermasian 
approach to public autonomy, insist that the deep pre-positive and proto-democratic structure 
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of public authority that we tend to associate with the state need not, after, all be exclusively 
tied to the state. Rather, if we concentrate on its general properties rather than its 
conventional historical model, it is a structure that can also be found in other settings. These 
setting may include state-like bodies such as the EU, where at least some of the cultural and 
institutional preconditions of the reflexive construction of public autonomy, including the 
recent trace of documentary constitutionalism in the ultimately abortive Constitutional 
Treaty, may be present.59 But, on one view at least, perhaps most fully developed in the 
recent work of Nico Krisch, public autonomy, understood in the most general terms as the 
expression of a right to self-legislation can also imagined and fashioned—can provide the 
relevant “scheme of intelligibility”—in other more modest and less state-like settings of 
transnational collective action. Such settings will be inhabited by actors who may be 
‘members’ of multiple polities and who, therefore, do not owe exclusive or even predominant 
loyalty to any one particular polity.60 Within this model of pluralist public autonomy, 
according to Krisch, the weight of any particular collective claim to public autonomy will 
depend upon many factors; “on the strength of its social grounding, of the participatory 
practices that support it as well as the plausibility of its attempt to balance inclusiveness and 
particularity.”61 The last element in particular is vital. Public autonomy in a world of 
interpenetrated rather than mutually exclusive political domains, of non-holistic commitment 
to multiple segmentalized polities each with widely ramified decision effects, has to find a 
new balance between the (more broadly) affected and the (more narrowly) affectively 
engaged. There must be sufficient common commitment to form a sense of common 
‘publicness’, but there must also be a recognition that insider and outsider are positions on a 
spectrum rather than categorical opposites, as well as an awareness that however the balance 
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60 N. Krisch “The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law” LSE Legal Studies Working Papers 12/2009, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418707. See also his Beyond 
Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010)  
61 ‘The Case for Pluralism’ n60 above, 38-39. 
 30 
of affected interest and affective belonging is resolved in any one polity context must be 
assessed in the light of how it is resolved in all other overlapping contexts. 
If we follow this approach, second order publicness may be revamped as a more 
mobile constitutive virtue of the law. And to the extent that original political authority can be 
conceived of in non-state settings, some of the burden of democratic publicness is removed 
from the second order input setting of the state, just as some of the burden is removed from 
the merely first-order and often predominantly output-orientated setting of the transnational. 
By this method, therefore, the test of the necessary publicness of law is one that tries to 
incorporate and remix aspects of all the main current strands of thinking—state-centred and 
reiterative universalists themes now joined and complemented by the possibility of original 
authority beyond the state. 
 
4. Conclusion: The Point of Departure 
Yet, for all that it seems to offer a new horizon of possibility, and one to which I have 
been attracted in my own work,62 the conditional nature of the above formulation leaves us 
with an urgent political dilemma, and one that remains wrapped up in a deep conceptual 
question. Politically, to what extent can the emergence of non-state sites of governance ever 
adequately balance the loss of public authority by the states? In turn, this is as much a 
question of the limits of our categories for thinking about the ‘political’ and the ‘legal’ as it is 
an empirical question. For the underlying issue is whether the kind of collective autonomy we 
can imagine for the various generators of a new networked space of transnational collective 
decision, whether we are talking about the regulation of football or of Olympic sport, or the 
registration of internet names, or the upholding of regional human rights, or the development 
of worldwide system for punishing crimes against humanity, or the protection of the rain 
                                                
62 See e.g. Walker n 37 above; “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317 -359; 
and in the specific context of EU law, “Reframing EU Constitutionalism” in Dunoff and Trachtman (eds) Ruling 
the World? (n52 above) 149-77. 
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forests, or the making of a transnational social market in Europe, bears a family resemblance 
to the kind of autonomy, originality and proto-democracy of collective authority we associate 
with the popular sovereignty of the modern state. 
To the extent that it does bear such a family resemblance, it is because we believe the 
idea of publicness, with its strong links to democracy, to be sufficiently capacious and 
flexible and to identify and capture enough that is continuous between the high modern phase 
of statehood and the new phase of globalization, that it remains a useful master category for 
our legal foundations. To the extent that we believe the family resemblance to be lost, it is 
because we believe the conceptual mould of modern legal authority to be broken beyond 
repair, so requiring the very idea of law to be understood through a new scheme of 
intelligibility.63  
Whichever side of the divide we fall on, however, we cannot, or at least we cannot 
yet, escape the idea of law’s necessary publicness. It provides an indispensable point of 
departure—in the sense of a starting point—for the key contemporary debate about the 
distinctiveness of our emerging ways of framing the domain of the legal in a globalizing 
world, in particular whether and how these ways are continuous with the received model of 
high modernity. Whether we may also anticipate a point of final departure for the idea of 
law’s necessary publicness—in the sense of its valediction—depends on the practical 
outcome of that debate.  
 
 
                                                
63 The division between an approach that utilizes and an approach that rejects ideas of ‘publicness’ can be very 
fine, so underlining the point that publicness is not just the paradigm case but also the limiting point of the 
modernist understanding of law. For example, Gunter Teubner develops a theory of law that seeks to transcend 
the distinction between public and private, but his depiction of constitutionalism as concerning the balance 
between the necessary autonomy and excessive jurisdictional scope and penetration of different functional 
sectors inter se in a differentiated global order is one which finds much resonance in the work of Nico Krisch. 
See e.g. G. Teubner, “Constitutionalising Polycontextuality” (2010) 73 Modern Law Review (forthcoming). The 
contemporary range and detail of putatively post-public theories of law is, of course, a vast topic in itself, and 
one for another study.  
 
